Administrative Appeal Decision - Jackson, Calvin (2020-02-04) by unknown
Fordham Law School 
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History 
Parole Administrative Appeal Decisions Parole Administrative Appeal Documents 
May 2021 
Administrative Appeal Decision - Jackson, Calvin (2020-02-04) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad 
Recommended Citation 
"Administrative Appeal Decision - Jackson, Calvin (2020-02-04)" (2021). Parole Information Project 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aad/575 
This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Parole Administrative Appeal Documents 
at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Parole 
Administrative Appeal Decisions by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of 
Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
STATE OFNEW YORK-BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMINISTRATlvE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 
Name: Jackson, Calvin Facility: Sullivan CF 
NYSID: 
DIN: 76-A-2732 




Monticello, New York 12701 
03-159-19 B 
Decision appealed: . March 2019 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of24 
months. · · 
,,... Board Member(s) Shapir.o, Agostini, Demo&thcnes 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Briefreceived September 23,_2019 
Appeals Unit Review: Statem~nt of~e Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, ~arole 
.Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
!',.~:undersigned determine that the decision appealed ii hereby: . l ~--_Affirmed _Vacated, remanded for de Mvo interview _ MQdified to ___ _ 
Commissio· er 
I / 
Affirmed · Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to----
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _ Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination must be annexed hereto. · 
-This Final Determination; the related Statement of ~he Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findin s of 
the Parole Board, if any, were ·mailec,l :to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on il JoJ.o 'JI 
Distribution: Appeals Unit- Appellant - Appellant's Counsel - Inst. Parole File - Central File 
P-2002(8) (l 1/2018) 
--
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Jackson, Calvin DIN: 76-A-2732  
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Appellant was sentenced to 25 years to life upon his conviction of 18 counts of Murder.  In 
the instant appeal, Appellant challenges the March 2019 determination of the Board denying 
release and imposing a 24-month hold on the following grounds: (1) the decision is unlawful, 
arbitrary and capricious because the Board relied on the instant offense without properly 
considering other factors such as his programming, , and remorse; (2) the Board 
failed to consider the COMPAS instrument; (3) the decision constitutes an unauthorized 
resentencing; (4) the decision was predetermined; and (5) the 24-month hold is excessive.  
 
As an initial matter, discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward 
for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a 
reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-
i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 
A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the 
Board to consider criteria which is relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the 
inmate’s institutional record and criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. 
of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).  
 
While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate decision to parole a prisoner 
is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  
Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite factors is solely within the Board’s 
discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th 
Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d at 717; Matter of Garcia v. 
New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  
The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give them equal weight.  Matter 
of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of LeGeros 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 (2d Dept. 2016).  In the 
absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory factors, it must 
be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of McLain v. New York State Div. of Parole, 
204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990).  Appellant’s reliance on 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8006.3(b) is misplaced inasmuch as that provision applies to rescission and 
revocation determinations. 
 
The record as a whole, including the interview transcript, reflects that the Board considered 
the appropriate factors, including: the instant offense during which Appellant killed nine women, 
most of whom he raped, by suffocation and/or strangulation; Appellant’s home life and relationship 
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with his mother; his criminal history with a prior State term; his institutional record including 
completion of the new SOP, receipt of his GED and discipline; his advanced age,  
 statements of regret; and release plans to go to a shelter or Fortune Society.  
The Board also had before it and considered, among other things, an official D.A. statement, 
Appellant’s case plan, the COMPAS instrument, a parole packet, letters from Appellant and letters 
of assurance. 
 
After considering all required factors and principles, the Board acted within its discretion in 
determining release would not satisfy the standards provided for by Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  
In reaching its conclusion, the Board permissibly relied on the nature of the instant offense against 
nine victims that terrorized a neighborhood, the pain and suffering Appellant caused the victims and 
their families, and official opposition to release.  See Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A); Matter of 
Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); 
Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of 
Almeyda v. New York State Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 505, 736 N.Y.S.2d 275 (2d Dept. 2002); 
Matter of Carrion v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 210 A.D.2d 403, 404, 620 N.Y.S.2d 420, 421 
(2d Dept. 1994).  While the Board does not agree that aggravating factors are always necessary to 
support reliance on an inmate’s crime, Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714, 
there are multiple aggravating factors present here – including the brutal and heinous nature of 
Appellant’s crimes against multiple victims that distinguish them from other rapes and murders.  
See, e.g., Matter of Hunter v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1178, 800 N.Y.S.2d 799 
(3d Dept. 2005).  In any event, the Board’s decision here was based on additional considerations.   
 
An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before 
expiration of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 
442 U.S. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 
N.Y.S.2d 982 (1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 
1997).  The New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and 
thus does not create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of 
Russo, 50 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d 
Cir. 2001); Matter of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 
797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
 
Appellant’s claim concerning the COMPAS instrument is without merit.  The 2011 
amendments to the Executive Law require procedures incorporating risk and needs principles to 
“assist” the Board in making parole release decisions.  Executive Law § 259–c(4).  The Board 
satisfies this requirement in part by using the COMPAS instrument.  Matter of Montane v. Evans, 
116 A.D.3d 197, 202, 981 N.Y.S.2d 866, 870 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Hawthorne v. 
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Stanford, 135 A.D.3d 1036, 1042, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 645 (3d Dept. 2016); Matter of LeGeros, 139 
A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834; Matter of Robles v. Fischer, 117 A.D.3d 1558, 1559, 985 N.Y.S.2d 
386, 387 (4th Dept. 2014).  This is encompassed in the Board’s regulations.  9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 
8002.2(a).  However, the COMPAS is not predictive and was never intended to be the sole 
indicator of risk and needs as the Board gets risk and needs information from a variety of sources, 
including the statutory factors and the interview.  Notably, the 2011 amendments did not eliminate 
the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case review of each inmate by considering the 
statutory factors, including the instant offense.  The amendments also did not change the three 
substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole.  
Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter 
of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is 
an additional consideration that the Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the 
purposes of deciding whether the three standards are satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State 
Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes 
v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017).  That is exactly what occurred here. 
 
Appellant’s assertion that the denial of parole release amounted to an improper 
resentencing is without merit inasmuch as the Board fulfilled its obligation to determine the 
propriety of release per Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) and after considering the factors set forth 
therein.  Executive Law § 259 et seq.; Penal Law § 70.40; Matter of Murray v. Evans, 83 A.D.3d 
1320, 920 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Crews v. New York State Exec. Dept. Bd. of 
Parole Appeals Unit, 281 A.D.2d 672, 720 N.Y.S.2d 855 (3d Dept. 2001).  The Board was vested 
with discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the minimum period 
of incarceration set by the Court.  Matter of Burress v. Dennison, 37 A.D.3d 930, 829 N.Y.S.2d 
283 (3d Dept. 2007); Matter of Cody v. Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 1142, 822 N.Y.S.2d 677 (3d 
Dept. 2006), lv. denied, 8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698 (2007).  The appellant has not in any 
manner been resentenced.  Matter of Mullins v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 136 A.D.3d 1141, 
1142, 25 N.Y.S.3d 698 (3d Dept. 2016). 
 
There is no evidence the Board’s decision was predetermined.  Matter of Gonzalvo v. 
Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 2017); Matter of Hakim-Zaki v. New York 
State Div. of Parole, 29 A.D.3d 1190, 814 N.Y.S.2d 414 (3d Dept. 2006); Matter of Guerin v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 276 A.D.2d 899, 695 N.Y.S.2d 622 (3d Dept. 2000). 
 
Finally, the Board’s decision to hold an inmate for the maximum period of 24 months is 
within the Board’s discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 
9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b).  Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 
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N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also 
Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013).  Appellant 
has failed to demonstrate that a hold of 24 months for discretionary release was excessive or 
improper. 
 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
